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The parties to this proceeding are those contained in
the caption of the case.
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OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is
Halladay v. Cluff. No. 860079-CA filed July 10. 1987. reported
as Halladay v. Cluff. 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1987).

A

copy of the opinion is included as Appendix "B".

JURISDICTION
The date of the entry of the decision sought by Petitioner to be reviewed is July 10, 1987.
Jurisdiction

of

this matter

is conferred

upon the

court by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (a) and by Rule 42.
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS

There are no controlling provisions of constitutions,
statutes, ordinances, or regulations applicable to this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Halladays to quiet

title to a parcel of property within the legal description of
Halladays'

title

Cluff

Bigelow,

and

which

had

for

been

occupied

in excess

of

by

the

30 years.

defendants
Mrs. Cluff

counterclaimed, claiming ownership on the doctrine of boundary
by

acquiescence

to a portion

of

the

property

Halladays were seeking to quiet title.
her

counterclaim

escence
property
title

did

not

lying

apply,

that

Mrs.

Mrs. Cluff pleaded in
if

Cluff

the

boundary

should

be

by

acqui-

entitled

to

to the west of her fence line and within her

line, but to which the Halladays had possession for a

number of years.
The
had

alternatively

to which

(Appendix "A")

trial court

been established

ruled

that

and quieted

Appendix "A" crosshatched

boundary

title

by acquiescence

to property shown on

in orange and noted by the designa-

tions "MNOP" to Cluff and Bigelow and awarded the green shaded
strip

of

rulings
Williams^

property
were

designated

consistent

15 Utah 2d

as

with

"WXYZ"
the

156, 389 P.2d

to

Halladay.

holdings
998

in

Both

Fuoco

v.

(1964) and Hales v.

Frakes. Utah, 600 P.2d 156, 389 P.2d 1*3 (1979).
Halladays
reversed
P.Rptt.2d

appealed

the trial court,
500 (1984).

and

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

in Halladay y, Cluff, et a l ^

685

The case was "remanded to the district

court for the entry of a new decree in conformity with" the
opinion rendered in the matter.
In reversing,
for

boundary

this Court

held

that

by acquiescence was not present

a fifth

element

to sustain the

lower court's decision, that being the element of a dispute or
uncertainty over the questioned area.
Upon remand, counsel for defendant Cluff requested a
hearing

before

the

trial

court,

and

presented

Mrs.

Cluffs

contention that the same rule of law should apply to the green
shaded

area

on

Appendix

"A"

marked

with

point

designations

"WXYZ" as applied to the orange crosshatched area marked with
the

point

designations

"MNOP".

The

trial

court

declined

granting Mrs. Cluff*s request to quiet title to the area within her

title

line.

i.e..

the green

shaded

area

on Appendix

"A", marked "WXYZ". lying beyond the fence line.
From
hearing.
Court.
Court

the

Mrs.
The

trial

Cluff

Supreme

of Appeals

filed
Court

pursuant

court's
an

ruling

upon

appeal

to

transferred

the

the

said
Utah

case

remand
Supreme

to the Utah

to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the

Utah Supreme Court.
The Court

of Appeals

rendered

its decision

on July

10. 1987.
Because

there have been two appeals of this matter,

the transcript of the trial contains three numbering series at
the

bottom

right-hand

corner

of

the

transcript.

The

typed

number beginning with page 1 was the assigned number the court
reporter

gave

to the

script was typed.

transcript

at

the

time

that

the

tran-

The stamped number on the same page in the

file transcript commencing with the number

102 was the number

given in the record filed with the Supreme Court on the first

appeal of this matter.
the

file

number

transcript

system

appeal.

The

The stamped number on the same page in
commencing

applied
most

by

with

the

recently

the

county

stamped

number

clerk

40

on

numbers

is

the

will

the

second

be

those

referred to in this brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At

the

time

defendant,

Cluff,

established

fence

155:12-21).

The

of

the

had

commencement

occupied

line

for

testimony

property

over
of

of

this case, the
within

30 years.

old

(R. 153:18-26;

plaintiffs1

the

an

witness, Elmo

Halladay, testified that the fence line had been placed prior
to

1930

fence
Street
back

and

line

that
in U

the

fence

shape,

line was

going

from

the

front

of

unbroken
100

South

in Provo, Utah, north some 231 feet, then across the
the

width

of

the

Cluff

and

returning south to the street.
had

a continuous

occupied

the

portion

of

Bigelow

properties,

(R. 99:3-24).
the

property

then

The plaintiffs

lying

within

the

defendant Cluff's title line, but lying west of the old fence,
a

strip

property
101:1-9).

approximately
(shaded

ten

green

Mrs. Cluff

on

had

feet

wide

Appendix
occupied

by

the

"A").
the area

length
(R.

of

her

100:28-30;

crosshatched

in

orange in Appendix "A" attached hereto for the same period of
time (Elmo Halladay, R. 106:6-13;

118:11-17).

At
defendant
property

the

time

Cluff

of

filed

crosshatched

the
a

commencement

counterclaim

in orange

had

of

the

suit,

the

that

the

alleging

become

her

property and

that of Bigelow by boundary by acquiescence and acknowledging
the same facts as to the property shown in green occupied by
the

plaintiffs

(R.

12-15).

The

defendant

Cluff.

however,

pleaded in the alternative that if the trial court determined
that

there was

not

a boundary

by acquiescence

and

that

the

title lines were to govern, then the trial court should award
to Cluff the property west of her fence but within her title
line, shown
shown

in green on Appendix

crosshatched

in

orange

"A", and

should

that the property

be awarded

to

Halladay

based upon title lines (R 12-15).
One

distinguishing

factual

circumstance

was

that

Halladays' title line did not connect to Cluff 1 s title line.
There was a no man's land between the title line of Halladays
and

the title

witness.
Thus,

the

line of Cluff. as demonstrated
engineer

Halladays

could

Clyde
not

Naylor
meet

the

(R.

by plaintiffs1

75;27-30;

requirement

76:1).
of

being

adjoining property necessary to have boundary by acquiescence
on the green shaded property.
In the opening statements
of

this

matter,

counsel emphasized
court

should

which

was

tried

that pursuant

conclude

that

to the court

the

without

a

in the trial
jury.

to the counterclaim,
area

shown

Cluff1s
if the

crosshatched

in

orange were to be awarded to Cluff by applying the doctrine of

boundary by acquiescence, then the area shown shaded in green
should go to the Halladays on the same doctrine.
court
area

should

rule

should

go

that

to

title lines governed,

Cluff

Halladays (R. 52:21-30;
At

the

approximately

time

and

the

53:1-14;
the

orange

But if the

then the green

area

should

go to

56:1-20).

Halladays

moved

into

the

area

1930. the fence line shown on Appendix

in

"A" and

marked by points Y to X to M, running north and south, thence
easterly to point N, thence south to point O and back to 100
South

Street,

was

in

place.

The

title

line

of

the

property as testified to by Clyde Naylor, Halladays1
witness,

encompassed

the

green

shaded

area,

Cluff

engineer

points

"WXYZ".

There was a gap which is shown on Appendix "A" as shaded blue,
lying just to the west of the Cluff title line (R. 75:27-30;
76:1).

The

testimony

of

Elmo

Halladay,

Mack

Halladay,

and

Madge Cluff all indicate that the area to the west of the old
fence and lying within the Cluff title line had been occupied
by the Halladays

for many years.

Likewise, the area

encom-

passed in orange crosshatching. that point of "MNOP" lying to
the

north

of

the Cluff

property,

had

been

occupied

Cluffs for the same period of years (R. 106:6-13;

by

the

118:11-17).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Petition for Writ
Supreme

Court

the

same

of Certiorari presents to the

considerations

which were

before

the

Supreme

Court

at

discretion under

the
Rule

Court of Appeals.
that

court,

the

time

that

it elected

to

4A(a) by transferring

exercise

its

the case to the

By transferring the case for decision from
decision

might

have

been

in

favor

of

the

appellant or of the respondent.

The granting of certiorari is

premature

frustrate

and

would

tend

to

the

purposes

for

establishing a court of appeals.
The Petition for Writ

of Certiorari raises the same

points raised by the brief on appeal presented to the Court of
Appeals.

The

granting

of

the

Petition

for

the

Writ

of

Certiorari would be inferential finding that the panel of the
Court of Appeals which decided this case did not consider the
Petitioner's brief.
The
Certiorari
identical
Appeals.

issues
and

issues

raised

the

brief

and

The Court

by

the

supporting

arguments

Petition
the

presented

for

Petition
to

the

Writ

of

are

the

Court

of

of Appeals specifically found that there

was no abandonment of Cluff's claim to the green shaded area,
but only an alternative theory applicable to both the parcel
lying within Halldays1
Cluff's title line.

title

line and the parcel

lying with

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A JUSTIFIABLE BASIS
FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari cites Rule 43 of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court as being satisfied in this
Petition for Certiorari.
that

in

his

Brief

in

However, Petitioner does not address
Support

of

the Petition

for Writ

of

Certiorari.
It

is

Supreme Court

probable

that

to the Court

every

case

of Appeals

assigned

could

by

be the

the

subject

matter of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari under one of the
considerations set forth in Rule 43.

Each litigant who loses

in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals could petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the hope that the Supreme
Court would reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Each decision could be claimed to be contrary to the decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court, or an interpretation of the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, as Petitioner claims in this
case, that the Court of Appeals did not follow the decision of
the Utah Supreme Court in the first appeal.
It
thrust

for

is

this

and

the

writer's

understanding

legislative

and

that

the

constitutional

prime
changes

effectuated to create the Court of Appeals was to reduce the
caseload in the Supreme Court and to afford more expeditious
rulings on the tremendous volume of cases being appealed from
the lower courts and administrative agencies.

If the Court of

Appeals becomes an additional step in the pipeline of ultimate
justice with each litigant attempting to appeal up from the
decision of that court, the purposes for which that court was
established would be frustrated.
The Petition

for Writ

of Certiorari

is premature,

since the ruling of the Court of Appeals remanded the case
back to the trial court for further hearings to determine if
the same factual circumstances apply to the green shaded area
as to the orange crosshatched area, and instructed the trial
court to enter an appropriate decree in conformity with this
Court's

earlier

decision.

The

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals on the applicability of the earlier decision of this
Court to the green shaded area and conceivably whatever the
trial court does may yet be the subject matter of a further
appeal.

As such, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is pre-

mature.

It is in conformity with the proper procedure for

filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but it should be
declined by this Court.

POINT II
DEFENDANT CLUFF DID NOT ABANDON HER CLAIM AS TO
PARCEL W-X-Y-Z. THE HOLDING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD.
The thrust of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
a claim that the defendant Cluff abandoned

any claim to the

property shown shaded green in Appendix "A".
Pleading

in

the

alternative

in

her

counterclaim.

Madge Cluff alleged that the property shaded green and marked
by points "WXYZ" on Appendix "A" was within the description of
her legal title but outside the old fence line.

Madge Cluff

alleged that if the court ruled that boundary by acquiescence
was

not applicable

shown

crosshatched

green and marked

to Madge Cluff1s
in

orange,

by points

line, but within Madge1
the same doctrine

should

the

acquisition of the area
area

"WXYZ" was

shown
beyond

as

shaded

the old

in

fence

Cluff1s title line and asserted that
be applied

to parcel

"MNOP" as is

applied to "WXYZ".
In counsel's opening statement to the court

(R. 52),

Madge Cluff1s counsel stated to the court:
We think that the rule of law and the factual
circumstances are identical on the green slashed
area as on the orange slashed area except to the
party who is in possession. (R. 52:21-24).
In the evidence presented to the court, it was shown
that Halladays had been in possession of the green shaded area
for a number of years and Mrs. Cluff had been in possession of
that portion of the orange crosshatched area contiguous to her

title line for the same period of time.

This writer went on

to inform the court of that possession

(R. 56). wherein he

What I am saying, when I said that the same
principle lies, if the court is going to follow
title lines rather than boundary by acquiescence, then we would be entitled to the green
slashed area and we believe that if Mr. Halladay
is entitled to the orange slashed area to his
title line, that we are entitled to move over to
the title line. There should be a consistency.
(R. 56:1-7)
THE COURT: . . . [B]ut as far as the fence line
is concerned here, you don't claim to the west
of it, right Mr. Jeffs?
That's true, we think it became theirs by boundary by acquiescence, the same as we claim the
other piece. But, if the court were to adopt
the rule
that
there was
no boundary by
acquiescence, and you are going to examine the
title, then I think we will be entitled to that
title. (R. 56:8-20).
The Court of Appeals, in substantial detail, reviewed
the very issue raised by Petitioner in the Brief in Support of
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and said, at page 42:
We have reviewed the record, with considerable care, with an eye toward determining
whether the claim was unqualifiedly waived.
Cluff's counterclaim was crystal clear that she
should be declared the owner of the orange parcel on the basis of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, but that if she was unsuccessful,
she should be declared the owner of the green
parcel because of the "identical circumstances"
concerning
each
parcel.
At
trial. Cluff
explained her position, through counsel, in
response to the court's initial perception that
she was conceding her rights to the green
parcel:

[quoting the above-quoted statement of this
writer].
The Court of Appeals went on to point out that after
the case was over, the trial court rendered its decision, by
saying:
It recited no waiver or concession by Cluff as to
the green parcel, but rather reached the merits
and
found
that
Halladays
had
established
entitlement to it on the basis of boundary by
acquiescence
under
the
cases
of
Fuoco
v.
Williams. 15 Utah 2d 156. 389 P.2d 143 (1964).
and Hales v. Frakes. 600 P.2d 556 (1979).
The Court

of Appeals

further concluded:

"We see in

none of this any concession or waiver by Cluff.11
The Court of Appeals made very clear that its decision was on the very issue now urged by Petitioners after a
careful consideration by the Court of Appeals, when that court
went on to say:
While we would in any event be unwilling to
construe that brief exchange between the court
and Halladays*
counsel as a concession by
Cluff. we are especially not inclined to do so
since the court in its decision made no mention
of any concession or waiver by Cluff. but
rather spoke in terms of a decision on the
merits. At the hearing before the trial court
following remand by the Supreme Court. Halladays1
counsel
acknowledged
that
the green
parcel had been tried and not resolved by stipulation. Moreover, the court's remarks at that
hearing, and in its subsequent written ruling,
make clear the exclusive basis for its decision
not to reconsider its disposition of the green
parcel was its conclusion that the failure of
Cluff to cross-appeal precluded it from doing
so.
No mention was made by the court of any
prejudgment concession or waiver by Cluff.
The

issue now raised was

decided by the Court of Appeals.

fully

considered

and well

CONCLUSION
The Petitioner has demonstrated none of the impelling
considerations

necessary

discretion

grant

have

the

provide

and

matter

another

for

a Writ

reviewed
step

in

this
of

by
the

court

to

Certiorari.

this

court

pipeline,

exercise

its

The attempt

to

is

an

and would

attempt

to

render

the

decisions of the Court of Appeals meaningless.

The matter has

been remanded

evaluation and

to the trial court

for further

entry of a decree in conformity with the decision of the Court
of Appeals, and that procedure should be allowed to go forward.
This

court

should

deny

the

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari.
Respectfully

submitted

1987.

"I A

this

25th

day

of

September,
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Mack HALLADAY and Merle Halladay,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigelow, and Norma
G. Bigelow,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Jackson.
No. 860079-CA
FILED: July 10, 1987
FOURTH DISTRICT
Hon. George E. Ballif
ATTORNEYS:
Dayle M. Jeffs for Appellant.
Brent D. Young, S. Rex Lewis for
Respondents.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Halladays commenced this action to quiet
title to a parcel of property sometimes referred
to as the orange parcel. They relied on their
holding actual legal title. Cluff counterclaimed
seeking to quiet title to the orange parcel on
the basis of boundary by acquiescence and,
alternatively, seeking to quiet title to another
parcel of property, sometimes referred to as
the green parcel, if the court determined to
adjudicate the rights of the parties with reference to legal titles rather than on the basis of
boundary by acquiescence. The unusual situation came about because Halladays held legal
title to the orange parcel, which Cluff1 occupied, while Cluff held legal title to the green
parcel, which Halladays occupied. If occupancy controlled, Cluff would own the orange

tcntly applied theory would cither party De
entitled to both parcels.
Cluff was successful at trial, persuading the
court to adjust the parties' competing rights
on the basis of the boundary by acquiescence
doctrine. Thus, she was held to have title to
the larger orange parcel primarily in dispute,
but Halladays got the smaller green parcel on
the same basis.
Halladays appealed to the Supreme Court
and were successful there. Halladay v. Cluff,
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court
held that boundary by acquiescence did not
apply, given the facts developed at trial, and
that legal title should control. See id. at 507.
Of course, since the judgment had been
adverse to Halladays only as concerned the
orange parcel, the orange parcel was the focus
of the appeal.2 The case was remanded for
entry of "a new decree in conformity" with the
Supreme Court's opinion.
On remand, Cluff argued that consistency
with the Supreme Court's analysis required
that her alternative claim be granted. Cluff
argued that if legal title was to control, it
should control the whole dispute, and she
should be awarded the green parcel, to which
she held title.
The trial court, however, concluded that
d u f f s failure to take a cross-appeal from
the determination concerning the green parcel
foreclosed any re-examination of that issue.
We cannot agree. Cross-appeals are properly
limited to grievances a party has with the
judgment as it was entered-not grievances
it might acquire depending on the outcome of
the appeal. See Cunningham v. LynchDavidson Motors, Inc., 425 So.2d 131, 133
(Fla. App. 1982)(cross-appeal only required
when respondent seeks to vary or modify
judgment below); Terry v. Zions Co-Op.
Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah
1980)("[I]f a respondent desires to attack the
judgment and change it in his favor, he must
timely file a cross-appeal ..."). See also 15 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3904 (1976).
Cluff knew all along she could not have it
both ways. Either boundary by acquiescence
would apply, in which case she would win the
larger parcel but lose the smaller, or legal titles
would control, in which event she would lose
the larger parcel but at least get the smaller
one.3 She could not plausibly argue one theory
as to one parcel and another as to the other
and walk away with both contested parcels.
On balance, Cluff would come out much
better if the boundary by acquiescence argument carried the day. She accordingly argued
for application of that theory. She prevailed at
the trial level to the fullest extent possible
consistent with a disciplined decision, even
thoueh she "lost" as to the green parcel.

proper response IO that appeal uas io ICMS.
the Halladays1 arguments and seek to have the
trial court affirmed. A cross-appeal would
not have been appropriate. Cluff had no dissatisfaction with the trial court's judgment,
which she simply wanted to have affirmed.
Moreover, a cross-appeal would have left
Cluff and Halladays making inconsistent and
contrary arguments depending on which parcel
was being focused on.4
Thus, the absence of a cross-appeal did
not, of itself, foreclose the trial court from
reassessing the status of the green parcel in
view of the Supreme Court's decision and
changing its decree as to that parcel as well, so
the "new decree" would be fully "in conformity" with the doctrine expressed in the
Court's opinion.5
However, for the trial court to be able to
address the green parcel on remand, i.e., to
reconsider the claim in the alternative that if
Cluff did not own the orange parcel she
owned the green one, it would be necessary
that that claim had not been compromised,
dismissed, or otherwise unconditionally disposed of. If, as Halladays suggest on this
appeal, Cluff unqualifiedly waived her claim
to the smaller parcel, without regard to the
disposition made as to the larger one or the
legal doctrine underlying that disposition,
Cluff would not be entitled to any relief. If,
on the other hand, the claim to the green
parcel was expressly preserved or had been
resolved only as a necessary part of the basic
determination concerning boundary by acquiescence, Cluff would clearly be entitled to an
opportunity to show the trial court that the
Supreme Court's reversal as to the larger
parcel necessitates a "reversal" as to the other.6
We have reviewed the record, with considerable care, with an eye toward determining
whether the claim was unqualifiedly waived,
d u f f s counterclaim was crystal clear that she
should be declared the owner of the orange
parcel on the basis of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, but that if she was
unsuccessful, she should be declared the owner
of the green parcel because of the "identical
circumstances" concerning each parcel. At
trial, Cluff explained her position, through
counsel, in response to the court's initial
perception that she was conceding her rights to
the green parcel:
What I'm saying, when I said the
same principle lies, if the Court is
going to follow title lines, rather
than boundary by acquiescence,
then we would be entitled- to the
green slashed area. And we believe
that if Mr. Halladay is entitled to
the orange slashed area to this title
line, that we are entitled to move
nvw tn the title

line
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Counsel for Halladays then sought to characterize Guffs position as conceding the green
parcel. The court explained that Cluff simply
wanted a consistent legal approach and concluded by observing: "So there will be no stipulations on that." The parties then presented
their evidence. After argument, the court
issued a written decision. It recited no waiver
or concession by Cluff as to the green parcel,
but rather reached the merits and found that
Halladays had established entitlement to it on
the basis of boundary by acquiescence under
the cases of Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d
156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964), and Hales v. Frakcs,
600 P.2d 556 (1979). Conversely, the trial
court found, relying principally on the same
cases, that Cluff had established entitlement to
the orange parcel on the basis of boundary by
acquiescence. Subsequently, the court entered
Findings and Conclusions which reflect that
the court reached the merits on both the green
and the orange parcels and decided both situations on the basis of a consistent application
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
A single, short decree recited the result of the
court's decision and quieted title to the green
parcel in Halladays and the orange parcel in
Cluff.
We see in none of this any concession or
waiver by Cluff. The only place to which
Halladays specifically point us in support of
their contention that there was such a waiver,
is at best ambiguous. The exchange followed
an unreported bench conference and is, in its
entirety, as follows:
The Court: As a result of a Bench
Conference, I think there is no issue
on that particular area, Mr. Young.
Mr. Young: The area of "W\ "X"
"Y" and "Z" on Plaintiffs' Exhibit
8?
The Court: Yes.
While we would in any event be unwilling to
construe that brief exchange between the court
and Halladays9 counsel as a concession by
Cluff, we are especially not inclined to do so
since the court in its decision made no
mention of any concession or waiver by Cluff,
but rather spoke in terms of a decision on the
merits. At the hearing before the trial court
following remand by the Supreme Court,
Halladays' counsel acknowledged that the
green parcel had been tried and not resolved
by stipulation. Moreover, the court's remarks
at that hearing, and in its subsequent written
ruling, make clear the exclusive basis for its
decision not to reconsider its disposition of the
green parcel was its conclusion that the failure
of Cluff to cross-appeal precluded it from
doing so. No mention was made by the court
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October 18, 1984 is vacated and the case is
again remanded to the trial court "for the
entry of a new decree in conformity with" the
Supreme Court's prior decision. In that
regard, Cluff is entitled to an opportunity to
show the trial court that the evidence adduced
at trial as to the green parcel, when squared
with the Supreme Court's decision, entitles
Cluff to the green parcel. If it does, the "new
decree" contemplated by the Supreme Court
should so provide. Costs of this appeal to
Cluff.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
R. W. Garff, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. The orange parcel was actually occupied and
claimed by the Bigelows and Cluff, adjacent landowners, apparently as though the undisputed boundary between them continued on through the
orange parcel. Bigelows are not parties to the instant
appeal and in the interest of simplicity we refer only
to Cluff even in situations where technically the
reference should be to "Cluff and Bigelows."
2. The orange parcel, labeled MNOP on Cluffs
exhibits, was referred to in Halladay v. Cluff, 685
P.2d 500 (Utah 1981), as the ABCD parcel. Id, at
502. The green parcel, labeled WXYZ on the exhibits, was not delineated on the Supreme Court's
map, but lies to the west of the ADE line on their
map. Sec id.
3. The trial court appreciated the need for a consistent approach to the entire dispute and later referred to its decree as "a fence-line decree."
4. The facts of this case are extremely unusual and
it might even look like a case where some kind of
"contingent" cross-appeal should have been filed.
That illusion disappears if one focuses not on the
component parts of the dispute but rather on the
dispute as a whole and the pivotal role in its resolution of the selection and consistent application of
one of two competing legal doctrines. Generally,
however, the decision whether to cross appeal is
simple. If a respondent wishes to modify or vary the
trial court's judgment, he must cross appeal. See
Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1060
(Del. Supr. 1986X*[Albsent a cross-appeal, the
{respondent] may not attack the judgment of the
court below with a view to enlarging its own rights
or lessening the rights of its adversary."); Terry v.
Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701
(Utah 1980). If he only wants the judgment affirmed, he should not cross appeal. Nothing in this
opinion should be taken to create allowances for
parties who should cross appeal but do not. See,
e.g., Bentky v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 622 (Utah
1984); Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No.
1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982); Eiiason v. Watts,
615 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah 1980). Sec also Ryan v.
State, 150 Ariz. 549, 724 P.2d 1218, 223 (Ariz.App.
1986Krespondent can't raise assignment of error
because issue not made subject 'of cross-appeal);
Broadhead v. McEntirc,
19 Ark.App. 259, 720
S.W.2d 313, 318 (l986Krespondent can't argue for
' *•'
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precluded raising attorney's fee issue).
5. Trial courts are in a much better position to
evaluate an entire case, including its nuances and
undisclosed pitfalls, than an appellate court. It is for
this reason that where, as in this case, all possible
ramifications of a decision on appeal may not be
readily apparent, a case will be remanded for such
proceedings as arc appropriate in view of the guidance offered in the opinion. It is no doubt for this
reason the Supreme Court, in addition to specifically directing the trial court to quiet title to the
orange parcel in the Halladays, remanded in general
terms for "the entry of a new decree in conformity
with" its opinion.
6. Loosely following the trial court's characterization quoted in Note 2, supra, Cluff wants nothing
more than an opportunity to persuade the trial court
that the Supreme Court's decision simply means the
court's decree should have been a "title-lines
decree" rather than a "fence-line decree."

